This paper investigates the marginal social cost of cash-cum-in-kind transfers (MSCKT). Based on a generalization of Wildasin (1984) , we characterize the marginal social cost of public funds which have shown to depend on the relation between labor supply and the publicly provided goods (cash-cumin-kind transfers). To estimate the response of labor supply to these publicly provided goods, and simulate the MSCKT for Brazil, we use the PNAD 2004 database (Brazilian household data). Our simulations suggest that MSCKT increases up to 14% if compared to cases in which cash-cum-in-kind transfers have their effects ignored on labor supply response on the part of individuals.
Introduction
For decades, economists have been posing questions on optimum levels of public spending. In view of its great relevance for redistributive policies purposes, the issue of social costs associated to public expenditures requires further analysis. This paper aims at contributing to the specific characterization of the marginal social cost of cash-cum-in-kind transfers by estimating its magnitude using Brazilian data. We first set a scene for this paper with a brief chronological overview of the literature.
A classic definition of the optimum level of public expenditure is provided by Samuelson (1954) :
, which is to say that the sum of the marginal benefit of a public good ( ∑ MRS ) equals the marginal ratio of substitution of this good in exchange for a private good of reference (MRT), which is usually cash. In other words, the marginal social benefit of a public good is a straightforward consequence of the private good quantity people are willing to give up in exchange for a specific public good, whereas marginal cost is the marginal transformation ratio between public and private goods (MRT). When these two sides of the equation are equalled ( MRT MRS = ∑ ), the optimum level of expenditure is obtained.
Samuelson's approach implicitly assumes that governments raise the revenue necessary for financing public projects through lump-sums. Provided that lump-sums are unusual in practice, the distortive effect of increased taxation on taxpayers preferences should be taken into consideration. To capture such effect, Pigou (1947) Note that when a government is fully financed by lump-sum taxes, MCF is equal to one. Ballard and Fullerton (1992) identify two distinct methodologies for measuring the marginal cost of funds: the 'PigouHarberger-Browning' and 'Stiglitz-Dasgupta-Atkinson-Stern' approaches. Within the 'Pigou-Harberger-Browning' approach, MCF has to be greater than one given the indirect costs of distortive taxes which increase costs associated to the provision of public goods. On the other side, under the alternative 'Stiglitz-Dasgupta-Atkinson-Stern' approach, MCF can be lesser than one in some situations, which would imply lesser costs if compared to the first-best situation.
Noteworthy MCF estimations, based on the first approach mentioned above, were done by Browning (1976 Browning ( , 1987 using data from the U.S. federal tax system. In short, the author characterizes optimal levels of public goods provision which is dependent of the marginal tax rate, rate progress, and the labor supply's compensated elasticity. However, Diamond and McFadden (1974) , have challenged the merits of different measures of dead-weight loss and the indirect marginal cost by unit of revenue used in those papers. On the other side, Fullerton (1991) argues that the incongruence between Browning's estimations and other authors were actually differences in the definition of MCF and not differences among parameters as alleged before.
Anyhow, within those approaches MCF is necessary greater than one. Accordingly, without naming it as such, two works have managed to isolate the marginal cost of public fund and benchmarked a new line of thought. Stiglitz and Dasgupta (1971) isolated and observed that the term is lesser or greater than one if the labor supply curve is backward bending. Atkinson and Stern (1974) also isolated MCF but further decomposed it into two parts: distortive effects and revenue effects. Distortive effects depend on the effects of substitution which make the public project always less attractive. Revenue effects on the other side, account for effects derived from the changed income due taxation and might reinforce the substitution effect like, for example, advocating against the public project implementation (very common event when income tax is considered). Given that revenue effects of taxation may increase labor supply, and consequently government revenue, they may also decrease the marginal costs of public fund. Stuart (1984) , Ballard, Shoven and Walley (1985) , and Ballard and Fullerton (1992) also apply this approach when estimating MCF. 2 Wildasin (1984) contributes to the literature by observing that the welfare evaluation of public expenditure should take into consideration the effect of incremental public provision on the demand of taxed goods.
Moreover, the author shows that this effect is not insignificant regardless of whether demand is ordinary or compensated. However, only one publicly provided good is considered in this model. In empirical terms, Conway (1997) tries to estimate the effect of public goods provision on the labor supply of individuals' response as suggested by Wildasin (1984) . The author finds public expenditures to be significant on the determination of taxed good demand (labor supply response). This result suggests that MCF calculation should incorporate the effect of incremental public provision on the demand of taxed goods, otherwise MCF is underestimated. We do generalize his model in this paper to estimate the marginal social cost of a bundle (cash-cum-inkind transfers) of publicly provided goods (MSCKT). This is an interesting generalization justified by the great array of Brazilian social programs, such as the Bolsa Escola, that can be considered a bundle of two goods: cash transfer (financial aid) and the publicly provided good (public school). 3 We propose to estimate the marginal social cost of publicly provided goods when taxpayers are distortedly taxed but can receive subsidies if consuming the public good. As such, the objective of this paper is twofold: i) to characterize the solution of marginal social cost of cash-cum-inkind transfer, and ii) to empirically show how different types of goods provided by the public sector affect the response of agents -these are the basis for estimating the marginal social cost within the Brazilian public sector (MSCKT).
We consider individual transfers (Bolsa Familia, PETI, public pension, etc.) as public expenditure retained by individuals and not as an involuntary income like in Conway (1997) . In doing this, we intend to separate the effects on labor supply associated to expenditures retained by individuals from other aggregated government expenditures like healthcare, safety, roads, etc. This is only possible because Brazilian data differ from the equivalent U.S. data in terms of transfers' complementarities. Consider the Bolsa Familia Program for instance. This program requires children to be enrolled and regularly attend public schools in order to receive cash transfers. Another type of complementary transfer is a program called PETI which requires students to attend extracurricular activities after the period of regular classes. It is then reasonable to expect that individuals do respond differently when exposed to a combination of public spending such as these two descriptive examples.
This scenario allows precise analysis of the cost-benefit relation within transfer programs which expand theoretical and empirical frameworks used in public redistributive policies.
This works is organized as follows. The next section characterizes the solution to the problem of homogenous and heterogeneous agents. Section 3 presents the estimations and section 4 the simulation of the marginal social cost of publicly provided goods using Brazilian data. Section 5 concludes the discussion and addresses the implications of results for public policies. Wildasin's (1984) model, mentioned in the previous section, can be extended to include a bundle of goods provided by the government with different benefits and different marginal costs. These goods can be either physical or monetary, which allows for a deeper analysis of the effect on welfare created by different social public programs. First, suppose an economy with H identical consumers and a twice differentiated and strictly quasi-concave utility ( )
The Model
, and consumption of public Goods G1 and G2 with their specific benefits and marginal costs. Being G = G1 + G2 the total quantity of goods provided by the government and α the proportion of Good 1 in this bundle in a way that G1 = αG e G2 = (1-α)G.
Only good 1 is taxed as , where Y is exogenous income (virtual income) in numeraire unities. The private production is competitive and subjected to a linear technology; in such a way that equilibrium price vector p is constant.
Demand functions ( )
and the indirect utility function are outcomes of the solution for the individuals' maximization problem. As in Wildasin (1984) , let MRSj be the marginal substitution rate between public Good Gj and the numeraire,
for j =1, 2 and, consequently, the derivative of the ordinary demand function for good i is
Let X1 = Hx1 be the aggregated demand of Good 1. To balance its budget, the government chooses t1 such that
, we can obtain the MSCKT,
We use the aggregated utility Hv as an indicator of welfare, in the same way as Wildasin (1984) . An increment in the quantity of the provided public
the marginal utility of income. Using Roy's identity
, we have the following optimal welfare criteria for the provision of a bundle of goods:
is the ordinary elasticity of Good 1 demand in relation to its own price. At the optimum level G (secondbest), expression (3) is zero. In this expression, the first right side term is the marginal benefit for society given public Good 1, the second term is the marginal benefit given public Good 2, and the third and forth terms are the marginal costs associated to the provision of public Goods 1 and 2, respectively. The model can be easily extended for n public Goods and the resulting expression would similarly be a difference between the marginal benefits sum of each good and the sum of marginal costs of provision. 4 There are two terms In expression (2) that make the marginal change in welfare simply different from t q ε is negative when Good 1 is a normal good or when it is a factor with an upward sloping supply curve. Assuming that the first term is zero t q ε will be greater than 1 and MRT1 + MRT2 overestimates social marginal costs. In this case, we can have 1 MCF < , in accordance with Atkinson and Stern (1972) .
Empirical Implementation
The methodology used to estimate the supply job response to variations in the public provision of monetary and non-monetary goods while taking into consideration net income and other income sources (e.g. endogenous 4 Deriving this expression in relation to α, we obtain ( )
, that is, if people assign a greater value to public Good 1, the marginal benefit increases according to increases in α, given that α is the proportion of Good1 in the bundle of goods provided by the government. However, if people assign a greater value to public Good 2, increases in α decreases the marginal benefit given that the proportion of Good 2 decreases. On the other side, if the marginal cost of public Good 1 ( )
is greater than public Good 2, increases in α also increase the marginal cost in equation (9) given that it increases the proportion of G1 in the bundle -on the contrary, an increase in α decreases the marginal cost. income) is proposed by MaCurdy et al (1990) and implemented by Conway (1997) . We conveniently choose a linear function of labor supply 5 :
where hi corresponds to the labor supply of individual i measured by monthly hours, Xi is the explicative (control) variables vector, wi is the individual's income (declared monthly income) 6 , Yi (virtual income) corresponds to other sources of income (rents, investments, inheritance, other family members income, etc.), G denotes the public expenditure variable (state public expenditure), Ti denotes individual transfers done by the public sector and appropriated by individual i (Bolsa-Familia, Social Security, etc.) ), β, γ, φ, δ and Γ are coefficients to be estimated, and ε is a random term assumed to be independent and identically distributed N(0,σ 2 ).
For our analysis, the variables used as control for individuals (Xi) are: age, squared age, schooling, squared schooling, number of school age children (6 to 15 years), number of children < 6 years old (in some cases as described below), race dummies, marital status dummies (married or not-in cases of non-stratified samples), job formality dummy, public sector job dummy, length of time living in the State (> two years) and local of residence (urban or rural area), and the change in the State GDP per capita. These variables are based on the related literature (Conway, 1997 and Avelino and Menezes-Filho, 2003) . The sample is restricted to people between 25 and 60 years old excluding self-employed and employer. However, To address this problem, we identify at least four instruments, correlated with the possible endogenous variables: a) the decision to work, b) the virtual income (Y), c) the individual's wage (w), and d) transfers (T) received by the individuals-but not directly correlated with the numbers of hours worked. In this paper, we use the following instruments to serve such purpose:
for the decision to work we use the State unemployment rates (tx_des) and the number of children less 6 years old as instruments. The first variable captures the regional effect of the activity level that influences the individual's probability of getting a job. The second was used only within the subsample single-women and follows Heckman (1979) where women with young children choose not to work. And finally, for the first stage regression (self-selected) which the dependent variables are the virtual income (Y), the wage (w), and the transferred income (T), we use the instruments suggested by Conway (1987) and Mroz (1987) : cubic polynomials of age and schooling, and country-regions dummies (North, NorthEast, South-East, MidWest and South). In the second stage we run a self-selected model specifying a bootstrap with 50 repetitions for residuals covariance matrix estimation.
3.a. Database
The analysis is drawn from monthly data of the 2004 National Household Population is powered by (-0.8) and multiplied it by expenditure -this expenditure structure better fits our data. In fact, we could used any ponderation (population exponent between 0 and -1) from total expenditures (G*pop^0) up to using expenditure per capita (G*(pop^-1)), depending on how public the good being provided by the public sector is. If it is a true public good, the first option ought to be adopted (G), if it is a good appropriated by individuals, expenditure per capita is the best option.
A quick scan of Tables 2A, 2B , and 3 present the summary of the results of specification (3) for men and women separately (complete estimations are available upon request). Table 2A presents the results for all women and women without children corrected by the self-selection decision to work. Table 2B separates women according to marital status: single versus married. 8 The summary of estimations concerning job entry decision is shown at the lower portion of Table 2B . Wage is insignificant for the sample containing all women and for single-women when total public expenditures (G) and Transfers (T) are included. For women without children, wage positively influences labor supply (estimated elasticity equals to 0.1, column 7) and negatively for married (elasticity -0.21, column 7). Income derived from transfers (T) is significant and negative for all estimations (see for instance, elasticity equals to -0.06 in column 2). Virtual income (Y) is positive in most of the specifications and, although disconcerting, this value is commonly found in estimations that consider progressive income taxation and do not implicitly impose (MaCurdy et al, 1990) . It is worth noting that this value for women is negative in Conway's (1997) estimations, however, the author considers transfers as part of virtual income -those are estimated separately here. For single women, when the variable transfer (T) is omitted, the effect of virtual income changes to negative (column 17). Results regarding public non-appropriated expenditures (G) seem to corroborate with the hypothesis that aggregated expenditures positively affect labor supply. That is, public Good (G) is complementary to the number of hours worked in the case of women. Moreover, healthcare disaggregated expenditures negatively, but education positively, affects women's decision to work (in all sub-samples). Once in the job market, all women are more positively affected by healthcare and negatively by education expenditures.
That portrays a consistent history: increased expenditure in education increases women's chance to get a job, however, once in the job market, those expenditures reduce labor supply in terms of hours worked /month probably because of their increased productivity. On the other hand, still in the case of women, increased healthcare expenditure reduces the chances of getting a job probably because women might not need to work to cover costs associated to healthcare. Then again, once in the job market, women are more inclined to work given increased expenditures on healthcare. Briefly, transfers (T) negatively affect labor supply in the case of women (except for married) and aggregated public expenditures (G) are substitutes of leisure, that is, increased G reduces leisure (increased labor supply). In the case of men, transfers (T) are unambiguously negative on labor supply, but aggregated expenditure (G) does not robustly affect subsamples. Transfers are not significant for married, but it is negative and significant for the entire sample of men and positive and significant for single men sample.
Lastly, it is worth noting that transfers are crucial when determining labor supply and consequently when MSCKT is estimated. That is so, not only because it is significant but also because it affects the signal and the magnitude of other variables (columns 3, 8, 13, and 18 of Tables 2A and 2B, and columns 3, 8 and 13 of Table 3 ).
Brazilian Data Simulation
To conduct illustrative estimations based on a more detailed tax structure,
we can extend the model described in Section 2 to capture the different preferences for the families of the sample. We follow Browning (1976) , and assume that governmental expenditures are financed by an income tax. Let Usually, the marginal tax rate of a family depends on its income level.
However, when marginal changes are considered around an initial equilibrium, we can assume that its marginal tax rate is not affected by small variations of the family income. In other words, no family starts with income at the dividing point between two income levels. Similarly, the budget constrain of family h is ) ( 
be the marginal utility of virtual income for family h. Now consider Roy's identity (
is the net (of tax) wage, v h is the family's indirect utility function.
As in Wildasin (1984) , we simply hypothesize that elasticity (ordinary income of labor supply ( ) We want to evaluate the marginal change in the quantity of public Goods G1 and G2 followed by a change in the tax rate which maintains the government budget under balance. In cases of proportional and linear progressive taxes we use the budget constraint of the government to implicitly resolve for τ in terms of G1 and G2. In case of non-linear progressive tax, we follow Browing's assumption that all marginal tax rates are proportionally progressive and, once again, resolve for changes in τ h using that budget constraint.
In order to obtain welfare indicators for evaluating G, we use a welfare function W (Bergson-Samuelson) that satisfies "simple neutrality" (SN), that is, the social marginal utilities of income are the same. That is, for a given µ,
. To evaluate changes in G, we first assume a proportional tax and when W is totally differentiated and divided by µ, we have:
With a linear progressive tax ( , 0 h y τ τ = ≠ ) the result is: Note that equation (6) is more general, of which (5) and (6) are special cases. Formula (7) is equivalent to equation (3) of the simple consumer model. Equations (2), (4), (5), and (6) of MSCKT show that we need labor supply elasticity in relation to wage ( l w ε ), and the response of labor supply to variations of public expenditure (
With formulas (4) to (6) in hand, we can estimate the marginal cost of public funding for Brazil, with or without the ordinary independence between labor supply and the publicly provided Goods. The bundle of goods considered for this analysis is a combination of in-kind Goods (G1 = total government spending minus transfers) and cash transfers from the government to citizens (G2 = total spending with direct transfers such as pension, Bolsa-Familia, etc.). Given that in-kind goods are defined in terms of numeraire, the marginal rate of transformation is equal to one for G1 and for G2. We are using the results obtained for the men sample (see Table 3 , column 4). The estimated value for the ordinary elasticity of labor supply with respect net wage is 0.41 and for the total income elasticity is -0.18. The average wage for men is R$5.7 per hour and they work in average 172 hours per month. In cases of proportional and linear progressive taxes we use τ = 0.373 given that the tax burden is around 37.37% of the GDP. For the nonlinear progressive tax we use a weighted average of the three types of taxes: 0% (between R$0 and R$1,257.12), 15% (between R$1,257.13 and R$2512.08), and 27.5% (> R$2512.09). 9 When ordinary dependency is allowed between labor supply and the provision of this bundle of goods, we use -0.001h/R$ for ∂l/∂G1 and -0.134 h/R$ for ∂l/∂G2. Table 4 shows the values estimated of the marginal cost of cashcum-in-kind transfers for proportional taxes where the population is normalized (Conway, 1997) when both ordinary independency and dependency (between labor supply and Goods G1 and G2) are allowed. 10 It is worth highlighting the discrepancy among the values depending on the assumption regarding ordinary dependency versus independency.
When there is independency, total MSCKT is 1.32 a value roughly close to the usual empirical results described in the literature. In other words, for each Real (R$) collected by the government through tax t1, the costs incurred by society is R$1.32. Obviously, with α = 0.5, G1's MSCKT is the same as G2's counterpart.
On the other hand, for proportional tax, when ordinary dependency is assumed between labor supply and public Goods G1 and G2, total MSCKT varies between R$ 1.34 R$ and R$ 1.51 depending on the value of α. When α = 0.5, MSCKT of public Good 1 is 0.662 and of public Good 2 is 0.85. That is so 10 When using the equations above, it should be noted that the income tax is not the only source of tax revenues in Brazil. If the rates used are applied only to labor income, it would provide a lesser amount of revenues than if applied to the total revenue -that would imply smaller government revenues than the observed. To compensate for this, assume the existence of a lump-sum tax that, along with the income tax, brings the total tax revenue up to the total observed, but it is not used for funding any increments in public expenditure. It is important to stress that the hypothesis about independency (ordinary and compensated, omitted in this version) are not compatible, therefore, to assume the presence of one is to admit the absence of the other and those are only extreme theoretical cases.
because cash transfers (G2) have a greater effect (more negative) on labor supply than government spending in publicly provided Goods (G1). Note that Conway (1997) ) and the resulting MSCKT are displayed in Table 4 , rows 6-10. (1984) . This result is maintained with ordinary dependency; however, total MSCKT ranges between 1.49 and 1.67 above the MSCKT interval of 1.342 to 1.511 for the proportional tax. In the case that 50% of the public expenditures go to income transfers (T) we observe MSCKT 14% larger than the case that independency ordinary is assumed. In the case of non-linear progressive tax (Table 4 , rows 11-15), we have that total MSCKT with ordinary independency is 1.19, below the previous results. This value (below in comparison to other taxes) are kept even when ordinary dependency is assumed with a MSCKT varying between 1.20 and 1.27 (an increase up to 6% compared to the ordinary independency situation). However, it is worth noting that, we use the effective tax rate of 16.8%. In order to compare the three tax systems we impose a tax rate of 16.8% as shown by Table 5 . Table 5 reinforces that MSCKT changes according to the tax system considered, and suggests that the non-linear progressive tax leads to the highest costs to society. The exemption rate also affects this outcome, specifically, the greater the exemption rate (exemption rate from 10% -calculated from our sample -or 21%-calculated from Brazilian Treasury data) the lesser the indirect cost (MSCKF) for society (lines 2 and 4; 3 and 5).
Lastly, Table 5 shows that by including only aggregated expenditure (G1), marginal social cost stay nearly unaltered (compared to ordinary independency) given that the response in terms of labor supply (taxed good) of agents is not too sensitive to this expenditure (see columns 1 and 3).
However, when we allow ordinary dependency of labor supply and transfers (T) we observe significant upward alterations in the estimation of MSCKF. That is the case even when only 5% of expenditure is composed by transfers.
Moreover, the effect is 4% above the estimated when only G1 is considered (column 3). This effect intensifies when the proportion between public spending and direct transfers increases. 
Conclusion and discussion
The main goal of this work is to estimate the marginal social costs of publicly provided goods when taxpayers are distortedly taxed but can receive subsidies when consuming that public good. This scenario allows precise characterization of the cost-benefit relation of transfers programs and has policy implications. We also estimate individuals' response to this bundle of goods (monetary and non-monetary) in terms of labor supply and conduct computations of marginal costs of public funding in Brazil.
Our estimations suggest that we should take into consideration the composition of public expenditure (in kind versus cash transfers) in order to determine the marginal cost of public fund. To the best of our knowledge this paper is the first to explore the response of labor supply to variations in public expenditures along with transfers received by families at the same time as MSCKT computed. Our simulations suggest that MSCKT increases up to 14% if compared to cases in which cash-cum-in-kind transfers is an ignored public policy. Moreover, most of this effect comes from the negative impact of cash transfer on labor supply response on the part of individuals.
Further panel data experiments based on municipal public finance data should be conducted in order to circumvent the agents' heterogeneity problem inherent in cross section analysis -and individuals' labor supply response could be more sensitive at this data level. Last, such cost-benefit analysis make more sense when a specific project is considered and therefore its effects on the taxed good can be clearly estimated leading to a more reliable estimative of the marginal social cost of funding that project. 
